The country must find equilibrium between hard-line secularism and religious extremism.

Rob Annandale - An inscription on a stone archway spanning a busy Istanbul street reads "Cumhuriyet ve demokrasiyi seviyoruz": We love the republic and democracy. Not many Turks would contest this statement but the current dispute over who should be the country's next head of state is once again highlighting the long-standing tension between two political ideals.

While the level of democracy has fluctuated, the republic—or rather, its secular nature—has risen to quasi-sacred status in the years since Ataturk essentially built Turkey from scratch after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its occupation by the victors of World War I. Since Ataturk's death nearly 70 years ago, the powerful military has been the self-proclaimed guardian of his vision of a modern Turkish state. In the course of this defence, the army has orchestrated the overthrow of four civilian governments. One such intervention led to the execution of a deposed prime minister who had loosened some of the legal restrictions imposed on Islam, the religion of over 99 percent of the population.

But other laws strictly regulating the public practice of religion remain, most notably the ban on headscarves in universities and official buildings. The presidential nomination last month by the moderate Islamist ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of foreign minister Abdullah Gul, whose wife covers her hair, has led to fears of a religious takeover. Although the post—elected by parliament rather than the public—is largely ceremonial, it holds certain veto powers that make it a significant component in the system of checks and balances intended to secure the secular order.

Gul's nomination prompted protesters to take to the streets for massive demonstrations and the opposition to boycott the vote. The Constitutional Court subsequently annulled the results on the grounds that fewer than the two thirds of lawmakers required for quorum were present. Moreover, the military issued not-so-veiled threats that it would intervene if necessary to protect the secular republic.

In the face of such opposition, Gul withdrew his candidacy while Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan moved up the date of this year's general election and is trying to push through a series of constitutional amendments, including one that would make the presidency a democratically elected position. Even if parliament were to pass the reforms, current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who is firmly in the secularist camp, is widely expected to use his veto.

Such a move could buy time for the secularists as a poll released by Sonar suggests the AKP may well lose seats in July's election. Its current overwhelming parliamentary majority is a quirk of a system that requires parties to receive a minimum of 10 per cent of the popular vote before it can have any seats. In fact, the ruling party only received slightly over a third of all votes in the 2002 election, but because it was only one of two parties to cross that threshold, it currently holds 363 of the Great National Assembly's 550 seats, just four shy of the two-thirds majority needed for changes to the constitution. The new poll places the AKP at 29.04 per cent, with four other parties over 10 per cent and two more within striking distance of the magic number.

If the Jul. 22 vote were to reproduce these numbers, Erdogan and Gul would have far less room to manoeuvre in parliament. And if the proposed constitutional amendments do not go through, the secularists may well dodge a bullet. For now. But if Turkey is ever to enjoy stability, it cannot be satisfied with such short-sighted tactics.

Rather, it must strive to find a balance somewhere between hard-line secularism and religious extremism. As a moderate Islamist party eager to join the European Union (EU), the AKP seems uniquely placed to undertake such a project. But it will need help from the EU—Turkey's biggest trade partner and a club whose membership Turkish leaders have coveted for decades—which must overcome internal divisions over its relationship with an important regional player.

During its time in power, Erdogan's party has performed much better than its predecessors in economic terms and undertaken a number of legal reforms required for the distant goal of EU accession. But its failed attempt to bring in a law criminalizing adultery last year set off alarm bells both domestically and in Europe. And in light of the latest crisis, Brussels can now add talk of a military intervention to its already long list of concerns ranging from poor economic fundamentals and human rights abuses to fears of a large Muslim population.

At the same time, Turkish opinion's enthusiasm for accession has waned considerably in recent years and the apparent hostility of French president-elect Nicolas Sarkozy to Turkey's full EU membership does not bode well for brighter days. But good relations between Europe and Turkey are essential for the long term well-being of both. Europe cannot afford to ignore a country boasting the second largest military in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), geostrategic positioning to die for, and the soon-to-be biggest population on the continent. And a sense that Europe is not dealing fairly with Turkey could lead not only to a hardening of Islamist positions but also to continued gains for the extreme right-wing National Action Party (MHP), which Sonar's poll puts in third place at slightly over 12 per cent.

The EU has said it will only deal with a democratic Turkey but the people's will appears to be incompatible with the repressive secularism of Ataturk's founding vision. It is incumbent on Turkey's secular establishment to recognize this fact and to work with the AKP to reduce potentially dangerous limits on religious freedoms. As the current—and likely future—government, Erdogan's party has to prove in turn it can avoid the slippery slope towards sharia that could tear the country apart. Although the EU cannot dictate Turkey's future, by resisting its xenophobic impulses and setting fair and consistent objectives for Turkish accession, it just might be able to provide both parties with the incentive to reach the necessary compromise.

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