(09/17/08) - Russia, American Missiles and NATO
The West must understand that Russia is, to some extent, right to feel uneasy
Gabriela Perdomo – As complex as the recent Russian-Georgian conflict over two Georgian breakaway provinces was, there is one simple fact that must not be forgotten: the former Soviet hegemon is feeling cornered. It was a matter of time before Russia sent a clear message to Europe and the western-led international community saying that it will not renounce to having a strong say in global affairs, especially in its own neighbourhood.
Gabriela Perdomo – As complex as the recent Russian-Georgian conflict over two Georgian breakaway provinces was, there is one simple fact that must not be forgotten: the former Soviet hegemon is feeling cornered. It was a matter of time before Russia sent a clear message to Europe and the western-led international community saying that it will not renounce to having a strong say in global affairs, especially in its own neighbourhood.
Since 2002, the United States government led by George W. Bush has been courting central European nations to help host an anti-missile shield that would protect the U.S. and its European allies from an eventual attack by "rogue" nations such as North Korea or Iran. Russia, first with Vladimir Putin as president and then with his hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, has strongly opposed the plan from the beginning suggesting that it would compromise Russia’s national security. Putin, who has retained control over foreign policy as prime minister, knew that 2008 would be the year that the U.S. would finalize the deal to build the shield.
And he was right. In July, U.S. state secretary Condoleezza Rice and her Czech counterpart, Karel Schwarzenberg, signed a treaty to station a radar base on Czech soil. A month later, Rice and Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski agreed to install 10 interceptor missiles in Poland as part of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. Both deals have yet to be ratified by the Czech and Polish legislatures.
The anti-missile deal has much to do with a campaign to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into central Europe—yet another headache for Russia. In March 2005, seven former members of the Warsaw Pact—the Cold War’s military alliance of Eastern European Soviet countries—joined NATO: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. NATO’s successful expansion then turned its eyes towards two former Soviet Republics—Georgia and Ukraine—who have started talks to access the group.
Russia has repeatedly opposed NATO’s efforts to lure more allies in the region. In March, just weeks after Medvedev handily won the election, the new president declared: "We are not happy about the situation around Georgia and Ukraine. We consider it extremely troublesome for the existing structure of European security. No state can be pleased about having representatives of a military bloc to which it does not belong coming close to its borders."
Then came the war. In early August, when the world was too entertained by the flashy Olympic Games in Beijing, Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili ordered a military incursion into South Ossetia, a separatist province full of Russian-passport holding inhabitants, in order to assert sovereignty over the piece of land. The Putin-Medvedev duo reacted immediately. A few days later, the Georgian army was decimated, Georgian territory was invaded, and the Russian government recognized the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another Georgian breakaway province.
It is widely believed that Russia had been preparing for these events for a long time. After all, a few years ago the government had handed passports to people living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which came in handy when claiming that the army was acting in defence of Russian citizens when its tanks rolled in to fight Georgian soldiers. In any case, there is no question the Georgian conflict gave Russia an effective vehicle to voice its displeasure over what it sees is "unjust" treatment from the international community, especially Western Europe and the U.S.
Following the August war, the international consensus is that Russia went too far—except for some opportunistic voices in Central and South America (Nicaragua and Venezuela). In Europe, Germany has been practically the only country to refuse imposing sanctions against Russia. German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier even called for an international inquiry into the Georgia-Russia conflict to figure out, basically, how much is Georgia to blame for what happened. Germany’s business community applauded the directive, since Russia is a big trading partner.
But is Russia not—to some extent—right to feel cornered by American and NATO interests? After all, NATO is an American-like-minded institution, and Washington’s defence missiles could, eventually, hurt Russia. That is no secret.
It goes without saying that Russia was wrong to invade a sovereign country, and went too far in its bravado by declaring independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia from the confines of the Kremlin without even asking the people for their opinion. But if there is one more conclusion that can be retrieved from this conflict is that somebody, somewhere, has to give the Russians real assurances that their nation’s security will not be compromised by NATO’s expansion or the U.S. anti-missile shield. That can avoid future and probably nastier military conflicts in other countries—most people are thinking Ukraine.
