As the president’s opponents present their credentials, the country’s electoral commission establishes key rules for the impending vote.
Mario Canseco For the past eight months, a power-struggle with no political parties or scheduled elections has taken place in Venezuela.
Mario Canseco
For the past eight months, a power-struggle with no political parties or scheduled elections has taken place in Venezuela. President Hugo Ch¡vez has seen his support dwindle due to economic problems, and a group of opposition organizations has tried twice to force him out of office through a vote.
Ch¡vez’s rise to power was chronicled all over the world. After serving time in prison for his role in an attempted coup, the outsider “colonel” revitalized the South American country’s electoral system by winning the 1998 presidential election on an anti-corruption platform.
A few months later, Ch¡vez moved forward with constitutional amendments, asking the electorate to back his revamped document in a referendum. Some of the changes included the elimination of the senate, and—most importantly for Ch¡vez—the extension of the presidential term from five to six years with the option of consecutive re-election. More than 3.3 million voters supported the alterations, which went as far as the country’s name: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
The plebiscite included the controversial Article 72, which allows for an election to remove elected public officials if requested by 20 per cent of all registered voters. At the time of the nationwide ballot, nobody imagined Ch¡vez would become the recall policy’s first subject.
In November 2001, the president ordered an overhaul of the fifth-largest oil industry in the world without consulting the National Assembly. The move marked the beginning of a series of economic problems that have significantly worsened in the last few months. Venezuela’s unemployment rate now stands at 20 per cent. The country’s national currency—the Bolivar—has lost 46 per cent of its value against the U.S. dollar in the last year.
This past May, a coalition of business leaders, labour unions and opposition parties was assembled to force a recall. On Aug. 20, the Coordinadora Democr¡tica (CD—Democratic Coordination) presented 3.2 million signatures—more than 20 per cent of all registered voters—but the electoral commission denied the request.
The CD began a new search for names, and the country awoke on Nov. 30 to an overly electoral mood. Long queues formed in 2,700 signature-collection sites installed in town squares and schools, where referendum proponents tried for the second time to enforce Article 72. Ch¡vez summarily dismissed the effort as a “massive fraud.”
This Friday, the CD is expected to deliver more than 3.4 million signatures to the electoral commission. While the lengthy process of counts, recounts and verification may take several weeks, the rules of an eventual vote have already been set.
Once all papers have been validated, a plebiscite has to be held in the following 97 days. The number of votes to remove Ch¡vez must be higher than the amount of ballots he received as a presidential candidate in 2000. In order to do away with the head of state, opponents must come up with more than 3.8 million votes, roughly 400,000 more than the signatures gathered by the CD.
The decision by the electoral commission was a surprise for both camps. Referendum supporters were hoping to achieve a simple majority against the president, regardless of turnout. The Ch¡vez side might now be forced into an all-out campaign to remain in office, angling for voters to play a part against the recall, rather than ignoring the exercise in its entirety.
